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ABSTRACT: Currently Fokker Space is developing the European Robotic Arm under contract of the
European Space Agency. Its main mission is the assembly and servicing of the Russian segment of the
international space station Alpha. One of the main hazards of ERA is that after a failure the arm could start
to move in an uncontrolled way. An unintended motion of ERA could lead to damage of the space station, or
loss of a cosmonaut who is operating the ERA.
The purpose of this paper is to describe how the safety requirements, given the specific possibilities and
limitations of a space robotic system, have resulted in design and operational constraints to control the joint
runaway hazard. Simulation results are presented to illustrate the safety efficiency.
1  INTRODUCTION
Fokker Space is developing the European Robotic
Arm (ERA) under contract of the European Space
Agency (ESA). ERA’s main mission is the
assembly and servicing of the Russian segment of
the international space station. ERA will be
launched in the year 2000. ERA is a symmetric
seven-degree of freedom manipulator of about 11
meters length which can relocate to various
positions (basepoints) on the Russian segment
(Kampen et al. 1996). It can transport large objects
(such as solar arrays) to a maximum of 8000 kg
during the russian segment assembly phase (Fig 1),
and exchange orbit replaceable units (ORUs) as
well as inspect the russian segment during the
operational phase of the station. The ERA system,
which has a flight segment and a ground segment,
will be controllable directly from a portable console
by extra vehicular activities (EVA) crew members,
or remotely from a laptop type work station by the
crew members inside the modules of the russian
segment.
ERA consists of several sub-systems (S/S), as is
illustrated in Figure 2. ERA consists of limbs,
joints, camera’s, basic end-effectors (BEE) and the
(main) computer, the ERA control computer (ECC).
Figure 1. Two cosmonauts on the international space
station Alpha use ERA to transport a folded solar array
package.
Part of ERA is the failure detection, isolation and
recovery (FDIR) system (Bos & Oort 1997). Under
contract of Fokker Space the National Aerospace
Laboratory NLR provides a major contribution to
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Figure 2. The ERA manipulator
The purpose of this paper is to describe how the
safety requirements, given the specific possibilities
and limitations of a space robotic system, have
resulted in a design, controlling one of ERA’s main
hazards, the joint runaway hazard. A joint runaway
might lead to catastrophic consequences, such as
loss of life when ERA would hit the cosmonaut, or
damage of the space station.
The outline of the paper is as follows. At first the
driving safety requirements are provided, and
various aspects of the hazard discussed. This is
followed by a description of the design- and
operational safety controls. Finally the achieved
level of safety is discussed, illustrated by simulation
results.
2  DESIGN DRIVING REQUIREMENTS
The following requirements (Bentall et al. 1995)
from the customer are driving the design:
• No single failure shall lead to loss of life or
serious damage;
• No second ERA failure independent from the
first shall lead to loss of life or serious damage.
 The requirement to be safe after a second failure
is implemented as follows: after failure of one
check, at least one other check shall be active to
ensure timely and adequate prevention of a
catastrophic consequence.
 3  JOINT UNCONTROLLED MOTION
 When ERA is moving, the ECC generates position
setpoints for all active joints at a rate of 20 Hz. The
setpoints are calculated from the mission plan
(which contains the motion trajectories), or from the
direct motion commands given by the operator. The
setpoints are sent to the joints via the redundant
1553B databus.
 The joint position control on the Joint I/O
microprocessor receives the 20 Hz setpoints from
the ECC and extrapolates each last received value to
generate setpoints for the joint velocity control loop.
The joint velocity control runs on the joint control
microprocessor with a frequency of 300 Hz (Fig. 3).
 Uncontrolled motion is the event when a failure
or otherwise initiates the ERA to deviate from the
planned trajectory, for instance one joint stops while
the others continue. When acceleration occurs due
to a failure this is called  joint runaway, which is
the subject of this paper.
 The most critical situation for joint runaway is
when the ERA approaches an ERA standard grapple
fixture (SGF) to grapple an ORU, or an ERA
basepoint (BP). During proximity motion (closed
loop control via the camera) and compliant (con-
tact) motion the arm moves close to the space
station in the order of centimeters, or is in contact
with the SGF / BP respectively. In these situations a
collision after a joint runaway cannot be averted.
When ERA moves in free space this is called free
motion.
 The hazard is characterized by two parameters:
the maximum kinetic and potential energy after
failure, and the stopping distance after failure. The
stopping distance is defined as the maximum travel
of the arm tip, measured from the moment of failure
occurrence to the moment of stationary standstill.
 3.1  Examples of the joint runaway initiators
• The ECC could make errors in the calculation
of the joint position setpoints from the mission plan.
• The joint control electronics (JCE), using
position- and velocity sensor data, calculates the
required motor torque. A failure in the sensors, the
control hardware, or the control software may send
wrong torque settings to the motor drive electronics
resulting in path deviation, excessive torque or
excessive acceleration of ERA.
• A single event upset (SEU) in the ECC or one
of the joints.
 
 Figure 3. Joint control, safety checks and joint safing.
 
 
In order to ensure that the hazard is controlled to an
acceptable level, an iterative approach has been
followed of alternating analysis and design impro-
vements. Among the analyses which were carried
out are: failure mode effects and criticality analysis
(FMECA), system hazard analysis, common mode /
common cause analysis, human error analysis, fault
tree analysis, failure detection-, isolation and reco-
very analysis, and warning time analysis.
4  SAFETY DESIGN APPROACH
The joint runaway hazard cannot be eliminated from
the design, because the hardware and software
functions that have to convert the mission plan
trajectories to joint motion can not be removed, and
hence for any selected design will be sensitive to
failures. When hazard elimination is not possible,
the hazard must be controlled.
4.1  ECC checks
In the ECC the path deviation check determines
whether the tip of the arm follows the prescribed
Cartesian path within the accuracy bounds (position
and orientation). The accuracy bounds are adjusta-
ble. The arm tip position and orientation is
calculated applying forward kinematic algorithms to
the joint position sensor data.
During proximity motion the Cartesian errors are
computed from the processed camera image of an
optical target. In this way higher position accuracy
is obtained because the calculation is independent
of the misalignments, (thermal) deformations and
bending in the robot arm.
The path deviation check is the most sensitive
check for low-acceleration failures, and runs on a
low frequency (2 Hz).
In case of compliant motion the torque-force
levels measured by the torque-force sensor in the
BEE are monitored as well.
4.2  Joint Fail-Safe Design and Checks
The motor drive hardware design is unsensitive to
motor runaway: the two-phase AC motor is driven
by a FET-bridge. An electrical short or open circuit
in the motor drive electronics would bring the
bridge in unbalance upon which the motor stops.
This appears to be safe but it is not: the other
moving joints have to be stopped, because the ERA
will leave the planned trajectory. Stopping of the
other joints is both ensured by a watchdog protocol,
and by the subsystem that reports detected failures
to the ECC. However since acceleration is not
present this is a slow effect and is not of primary
concern.
The joint checks have to be simple because of
the limited computing power in the joint. All joint
detection thresholds are adjustable.
To control the hazard, in each joint there is a
torque check (Fig. 3), one on each phase of the AC
motor. Its role is to detect failures which result in a
high (650 Nm at maximum) motor torque. These
are the most hazardous. The torque check
redundantly measures the motor current and via a
comparator, without intervention of software, it
switches off the motor current upon exceedence of
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performed by circuit breakers. The brakes engage
autonomously upon loss of current.
The torque check is entirely independent of
software and control failures, but it does not detect
failures like wrong position or velocity. It is the pri-
mary safety barrier against the common mode
failure of joint velocity control and velocity tracking
error check, which may inject high motor torques in
the joint. It is hot redundant in order to provide two-
failure tolerance.
The velocity tracking error check is the fastest
check in the joint software, both for its frequency
(300 Hz) and since the monitored velocity
originates from the motor side of the gearbox.
Failure of the joint velocity control micropro-
cessor (for instance the clock freezes or the software
gets stuck in an infinite loop) could both lead to
joint runaway and disable the joint velocity tracking
error check. For this failure an internal watchdog
ensures that the joint is brought to safe status.
The joint position tracking error check runs at 20
Hz. It is the slowest joint check because of the
hysteresis effects and flexibility in the gearbox.
However, it is the primary barrier to protect against
an inadvertent position step in the ECC position
setpoints. Also it is the only joint check which will
notice a static velocity error or position drift.
Loss of the joint position control microprocessor
also disables the position tracking error check, but
again the joint internal watchdog will ensure all
motion is stopped.
4.3 Operational measures
Depending on the operational situation different
safety constraints exist. During free motion, ERA
moves relatively far away from the space station,
with relatively high speed. To limit possible
collision impact energy, the maximum allowed
coasting speed depends on presence and inertia of a
carried ORU. The maximum speed is calculated to
restrict the possible kinetic energy to less than 4.0
Joule after two ERA failures. In addition, the
stopping distance after two failures shall be smaller
than 40 cm.
Also the cosmonauts shall keep a safety distance
of more than 80 cm to all ERA moving parts.
ERA approaches the space station in proximity
motion, where the cameras image is used for more
accurate closed loop control. Grappling payloads is
performed under compliant motion, where the
Torque/Force sensor is used to prevent force build-
up.
To constrain possible impact and build-up of
potential energy due to motor runaway in proximity-
and compliant move, the maximum speed is
calculated to limit the maximum kinetic energy to
0.5 Joule maximum after two ERA failures. The
stopping distance after two failures shall be smaller
than 15 cm.
5  JOINT RUNAWAY STOPPING DISTANCE
The joint runaway stopping distance consists of six
phases (Fig. 4): a) before the runaway the ERA tip
is moving nominally; b) when the motor runaway
occurs the joint starts to accelerate; c) the runaway
is detected, but the acceleration continues until joint
safing is executed; d) first the failed joint cuts the
motor current and the acceleration ceases while the
other ERA joints continue to move; e) after
mechanical latency the brake engages and the
runaway joint decellerates; f) The ECC has received
the signal that the joint is unhealthy and brings the
other joints to an emergency stop; g) the ERA

















Figure 4. Phases in Joint Runaway Safing. The shaded
surface represents the stopping distance.
From Figure 4 it becomes visible that an important
safety risk of the joint runaway is vested in the
acceleration part. Large stopping distances would
result when a high acceleration is detected and safed
too late. For this reason and to be independent of
software, the torque check was implemented
entirely in hardware. Also to prevent safing latency
it was decided that the joint safing should be as
much as possible independent of the ECC, and
therefore located inside the joints.
The various phases can be modelled to calculate
the stopping distance. To allow a first assessment
the phases were implemented in a spreadsheet. In
Figures 5, 6 the stopping distance is calculated for
each of the joint and ECC checks, for the no
payload and 3000 kg payload cases respectively.
These calculations are excluding the joint gearbox
and limb flexibility.
Figure 5: stopping distance per check versus the
acceleration caused by the failure while ERA carries no
payload and moves with an initial arm tip velocity of 10
cm/s.
Figure 6: stopping distance per check versus the
acceleration caused by the failure while ERA carries a
payload of 3000 kg, at initial arm tip velocity of 4 cm/s.
6  SIMULATION RESULTS
Below some preliminary simulation data obtained
with the ERA Simulation Facility (ESF) are presen-
ted. ESF contains detailed dynamic models of ERA
and is being used for the ERA flight qualification of
threedimensional motion.
For the simulations the following cases were
selected: for the shoulder pitch joint and with
stretched arm motor runaway could result in high
arm tip acceleration because of the approximately
10-meter arm length. An important hazard is the
maximum acceleration of the motor. Another
important case is a runaway torque just below the
torque check threshold: here only the velocity error
check and the joint position error check are fast
enough to bring the ERA to a safe stop.
Further the effect of transporting a large payload
(3000 kg) on the joint runaway stopping distance is
simulated, to investigate the larger oscillation
amplitude due to higher inertia. As a last case, the
stopping distance of a joint runaway on the “hand”
side of ERA is simulated to investigate possible
acceleration effects of the lower inertia.
All the above simulations were performed at
maximum free motion speed and including
mechanical and structural flexibility.
To investigate the influence of higher velocities,
the shoulder pitch runaway was also simulated for
double coasting velocity.
6.1  Shoulder pitch joint runaway
From Figure 7 it can be observed that the stopping
distance is in the same order of magnitude as in
Figure 5, when taking into account the increased
stopping distance due to the flexibility.
Figure 8 shows that the stopping distance is a
factor of approximately 5 worse than calculated in
Figure 5. This is because the gearbox, in response to
the acceleration of the input axel from the motor,
due to its flexibility first winds up and then
accelerates. The position sensor, measuring at the
joint output axis, is delayed in its detection due to
the wind-up. The torque check and speed error
check do not degrade from this effect because they
directly measure the current and the motor axis
velocity respectively.
Figure 7: simulated stopping distance of a shoulder pitch
joint runaway with maximum failure torque, detected by
the torque check. Dotted line: without limb flexibility.
Straight line: with limb flexibility.
Figure 8: simulated stopping distance of a shoulder pitch
joint runaway with maximum failure torque, detected by
the joint position error check. Dotted line: without limb
flexibility. Straight line: with limb flexibility.
The thus built up potential energy (in all three pitch
joint gearboxes) causes oscillations in the ERA tip
acceleration, and overshoot after engagement of the
brakes. It is expected that this effect is less for other
ERA poses because of their lower inertia.
6.2  Path deviation check
The gearbox wind-up is expected to be also present
in the path deviation check (PDC), which was not
simulated yet. From Figures 5 and 6 it appears that
the stopping distance of the PDC could grow
unacceptably high, caused by the low frequency of
the check and the wind-up effect.
In this respect it should be noted that most
failures would not lead to acceleration, but to a
transient or steady state error where the stopping
distance due to joint runaway is not relevant. For
these failures the PDC is more sensitive than the
joint checks, because the joint can not be adjusted
inside the range which is used for nominal control,
and because the PDC software is independent from
failures inside the joint. The joint checks function as
safeguard against joint runaway, the PDC against
more subtle steady-state errors.
6.3
  Influence of 3000 kg payload
Figure 9: simulated stopping distance of a shoulder pitch
joint runaway during transport of a 3000 kg ORU,
detected by the torque check. Dotted line: without limb
flexibility. Straight line: with limb flexibility.
For the calculated stopping distance in Figure 6, it
appears that the presence of 3000 kg on the tip of
ERA results in a shorter stopping distance than
without a payload. However, Figure 9 shows that
the gearbox and limb flexibility wind-up effect
increases the stopping distance due to the higher
inertia.
6.4
  Hand pitch joint runaway
Figure 10: stopping distance simulation of a hand pitch
joint runaway, detected by the torque check. Dotted line:
without limb flexibility. Straight line: with limb
flexibility.
Figure 10 shows that for the hand pitch joint the
stopping distance basically is identical to the
shoulder pitch joint stopping distance, with the
exception of the joint position error check. This is
caused by the decreased wind-up effect.
6.5  Higher coasting speed
To shorten the mission duration, higher speed could
be allowed during free motion. In that case the
minimum safe distance of ERA to its surrounding
objects has to be adjusted in coherence with the
maximum possible stopping distance. Also the
cosmonauts minimum safe distance to ERA should
be adjusted when necessary.
6.6  Stopping distances
From the simulation results the following stopping
distances were derived (Table 1). Of the given
stopping distances the ones printed in bold indicate
the fulfillment of the two-failure tolerance
requirement. All rows except the last were
performed when ERA was moving at maximum
coasting speed of the arm tip.
Table 1: stopping distances for the different joint checks
stopping distance (cm)
torque check /













tip velocity 10 cm/s
10 / 9 / 40 -- / 8 / 38
shoulder pitch
no payload
tip velocity 20 cm/s
17 / 18 / 65
shoulder pitch
payload 3000 kg
tip velocity 4 cm/s
14 / 11 / 18 -- / 13 / 40
hand pitch
no payload
tip velocity 10 cm/s
10 / 7 / 10
7  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
From the first simulation results a tentative conclu-
sion can be drawn that the ERA complies with its
safety requirements for the joint runaway hazard.
The torque check and velocity error check are
effective means to nearly eliminate the acceleration
phase effect.
The design results in the initial velocity being the
driving parameter for the stopping distance, not
motor torque of the joint runaway.
The checks that directly monitor the motor
motion or its current detect a joint runaway faster
than the checks that monitor the joint output axis,
because of flexibility inside the gearbox.
Higher velocity can be allowed for free motion,
when the minimum safe distance of ERA to objects
and cosmonauts is adjusted as necessary.
When payloads are carried by ERA, the related
maximum coasting speed ensures that the stopping
distance remains similar as for the unloaded ERA.
A joint runaway in a hand joint instead of a
shoulder joint gives a similar stopping distance for
the torque check and speed error check, but
decreases for the joint position error check and the
path deviation check.
The path deviation check in the ECC is a
necessary check to detect steady state and transient
errors, and because of its independence from the
joint.
Further verification and validation will be
performed by simulation of joint runaway for other
joints and ERA poses, and by testing of single joints
and on the ERA zero-G simulation facility.
For ERA, extensions of its capabilities by means
of tools are under investigation, as well as applica-
tion of ERA on target platforms other than the Rus-
sian segment of the international space station
(Boumans 1996). The platform-independent design
of ERA makes it suitable for a scala of applications,
like servicing of a panel with scientific instruments
that are mounted external to the space station. And
so the new millenium could be the beginning of a
new ERA.
8  REFERENCES
Bentall R.H. et al. (1995). ERA System Requirements
Document, ESA document HS-RQ-ER-0001-ESA
Bos, J.F.T. (1996). ERA FDIR Analysis report, NLR
report CR95459 L
Bos, J.F.T, Oort, M.J.A. (1997). Failure Detection,
Isolation and Recovery system concept for the
European Robotic Arm, Proc. Int. Conf. on Safety
and Reliability ESREL ‘97, Lisbon, Portugal, June
17-20, pp. 2285 - 2292
Bosman R.A. (1996). System Hazard Analysis, Fokker
Space report HS-AS-ER-004-FSS
Boumans R. et al. (1996). ERA: Baseline capabilities
and future perspectives, Proc. 4th ESA workshop on
Advanced Space Technologies for Robotic
Applications ASTRA”, 6-7 Nov 1996, ESTEC,
Noordwijk, the Netherlands.
Kampen S. et al. (1995). The European Robotic Arm
and its role as part of the Russian segment of the
International Space Station Alpha, paper IAF-95-
T.3.03
The Control of the Joint Runaway
Hazard
for the European Robotic Arm on
the
International Space Station Alpha
R.A. Bosman1, J.F.T. Bos2
1 Fokker Space B.V.
P.O. Box 32070, 2303 DB Leiden, the Netherlands,
E-mail: r.bosman@fokkerspace.nl
2
 National Aerospace Laboratory NLR
P.O. Box 90502, 1006 BM Amsterdam, the Netherlands,
E-mail: jftbos@nlr.nl
ABSTRACT
Currently Fokker Space B.V. is developing the European
Robotic Arm (ERA) under contract of the European Space
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thus threatening the life of the cosmonauts who are operating
the ERA. An unintended motion of ERA could lead to damage
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